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Abstract 
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous offer bargaining game of 
incomplete information with discounted playoffs. In each period, each player chooses 
to give in or hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses to 
give in, at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates, with an 
agreement benefit accruing to each player, and a cost to the player (or players) that give
in. Players have privately known agreement benefits. 'Low benefit players have a weakly 
dominant strategy to hold out forever; high benefit players would be better off giving in 
if they knew their opponent was planning to hold out forever. 
For any discount factor there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two players 
alternate in their willingness to give in, if the players' priors about each others type are 
sufficiently asymmetric. Second, for almost all priors, this is the unique equilibrium if 
the discount factor is close enough to one. 
1 INTRODUCTION
Endogeneity of Alternating Offers 
in a Bargaining Game1 
There has been a large literature over the last decade studying the bargaining 
problem when there are costs of delay. Rubinstein [1982] launched this literature with 
his seminal paper formulating this novel approach for the study of bargaining. His 
original model was a complete information game with alternating offers for division of a 
fixed pie. A significant feature of this model is that it has a unique stationary 
equilibrium with intuitively sensible properties. Subsequent work has extended the 
model by introducing incomplete information (see Cramton [1984], Chatterjee and 
Samuelson [1987], Abreu and Gul [1992], Grossman and Perry [1986], Ausbel and 
Deneckere [19S-6]) .  All of these models have assumed the same basic extensive form as 
is assumed by Rubinstein - namely an alternating offer framework. 
In the context of a simple model, we offer a partial answer to the following 
question. Why should one assume an alternating offer structure in a bargaining game, 
and how do the results change if we assume a different game form? The problem of 
choice of extensive form has remained unanswered in the decade since it was first 
articulated by Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985, p. 73): 
" the reliance of the noncooperative approach on particular 
extensive forms poses two problems. First, because the results 
depend on the extensive form, one needs to argue that the chosen 
specification is reasonable -- that it is a good approximation to the 
extensive forms actually played. Second, even if one particular 
extensive form were used in almost all bargaining, the analysis is 
incomplete because it has not, at least to-date, begun to address the 
question of why that extensive form is used. This chapter will 
consider the first point of extending the class of bargaining games for 
which we have solutions. The second and harder problem, we will 
leave unresolved." 
In this paper, we investigate a two-person simultaneous offer model of bargaining 
game with incomplete information. In each period, there is a simultaneous move in 
1This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant #SES-9223701 to 
the California Institute of Technology. 
which each player chooses either to give in or to hold out. The game continues until at 
least one of the players chooses to give in, at which point agreement is reached and the 
game ends, with a benefit accruing to each player, and a cost to the player (or players)
that gave in. Players have privately known agreement benefits. Low benefit players 
have a dominant strategy to always hold out, and a high benefit player's best response 
depends on what the opponent does. 
For any discount factor, we find that for asymmetric enough priors over the types 
of the players, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in 
-their willingness to give in. Moreover, for any amount of asymmetry of priors, this is 
the unique Nash equilibrium for sufficiently high discount factors. These uniqueness 
results do not require additional restrictions such as stationarity of strategies or 
sequential rationality. Thus, in a very strong sense, alternating offers arise 
endogenously, even when the underlying game form has a simultaneous move structure. 
The mo�el we analyze can be viewed as a version of the war of attrition game 
(Maynard Smith 1974) with incomplete information in which one of the types has a
dominant strategy to fight forever. Thus it is an incomplete information version of a 
simple game of timing (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). The possibility of multiple
equilibria with an alternating play structure for complete information wars of attrition 
is reported in Hendricks and Wils.on (1989) for reasons related to the existence of 
multiple asymmetric equilibrium in a one-shot game of chicken. This paper reports a 
much stronger result that the unique Nash equilibrium necessarily exhibits an
alternating play structure if player beliefs are sufficiently asymmetric or if the discount 
factor is sufficiently close to one. 
2 A BARGAINING GAME 
We consider a two person simultaneous offer bargaining game, in which, at each move, 
the players can decide to hold out (H) or give in (G). The game ends as soon as the
first player decides to give in, with payoffs given in the following matrix. 
2 
G H 
G bl b2 bl 1 
H 1 b2 0 0 
Each player discounts payoffs if the game ends on move T by a common discount factor
6T - 1. Here we consider an incomplete information version of the game in which each
player has two possible types (values of bi), bL and bn, where bL < 0 < bn < 1. The
probability that that bi = bn equals ri for player i, which is common knowledge. \Ve
will also write b = b H·
We represent the infinite horizon game in its reduced normal form. Let 
S 1 = S 2 = { oo,O, 1,2, . . .  , t, . . . } be the set of pure actions available to each type of each
player, where oo corresponds to never giving in and a nonnegative integer t corresponds
to holding out for exactly t rounds before giving in. The set of mixed actions available 
to each type of each player is Ei = {(7r00, ?T0,?T1,. . .  ):?rt 2:: 0 for all t, and l:t ?Tt = l}. A
mixed strategy for i is a pair (7rk,7ri) E Ei x Ei, which specifies a probability
distribution over how many periods to hold out, depending on type (H or L). Let ri be
the prior belief that player i is a high benefit type, aµd r = (r1, r2) be the prior belief
profile. We assume throughout that· 1 > ri > O, i = 1, 2. We write ri = 1 - ri for i = 1, 2
to be the corresponding probability of a low benefit type and denote Pi = ri7rk+ri7ri E
Ei. Then for any p E E1 x E2, the expected payoff to player i is:
if b· = b . i 
Similarly, the payoff to i for using a pure strategy t when j uses p j is:
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3 SOLUTION
First, it is clear from the normal form that since bL < 0, strategy 0 is strictly
dominated for all b L types, and iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
leaves only "oo" for bL since r-=/:- 0. So 7ri00 = 1 in any Nash equilibrium. Thus, we just
need to determine the strategy of the high benefit types. Similarly, one can show 
7rYf = 0 in any Nash equilibrium. This is proved as Lemma 0 in the Appendix.
Henceforth we drop type subscripts and suppress this oo action, replacing Pioo with (1 -
ri) and Pit = 7rifI, t = O, 1, 2, . . ..
and 
Define 
R-b- 8b1- 8b
Q _ 1 + 8 R = (1 - 8
2)b
- 8 8(1- 8b)° 
We also use the notation 
and 
R-1 R- 1- b - 1- 8b
Q-1 Q- 8- b - 8(1- 8b)
We first prove some properties of the equilibrium strategy. 
Lemma 1: Let p = (p1, p2) be a Nash equilibrium. If Pjt = 0 for some t, then
Pi, t + 1=Pj,t+2 = 0.
Proof: Assume that Pjt = 0. Then
Mi(t + 1, pj) = Lt< 18t+ 1bpjl + Lt> 1[8
1r j + 8t + 1ri]Pj/
-" . .ct + lb + " [ d + d+ 1- .b] .L...t t � 1° P jl .L...t t > I u r j u r j P jl
< Lt� 18tbpjl +Lt> 1[8
1rj + 8tri]Pjl = Mi(t, pj)
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It follows that for player i, pure strategy t is better against p j than pure strategy t + 1.
Hence, in equilibrium, strategy t + 1 cannot be adopted with positive probability. D 
From Lemma 0 and Lemma 1, it follows that any Nash equilibrium will have at 
most two phases: a phase in which both players make offers with positive probability 
every round (the simultaneous offer phase) followed by a phase in which players 
alternate in their willingness to make offers (the alternating offer phase). Either phase 
could be empty, but if both phases exist in an equilibrium, the alternating offer phase 
must always follow the simultaneous offer phase. 
Lemma 2: If p = (p1,p2) is a Nash equilibrium, and t is any integer, then
a. Pit> 0 and Pi, t + 1 > 0 :::} p jt = R [J1 - E f: �P 11] = �R
t 
b. 'Pjt < R [Jj- Ef: �Pj1]:::} Pi,t+ 1=0
c. P Jt > R [J1 - E f: �P 11] :::} Pit = 0
Proof: Assume that Pik > 0, for k = t, t + 1. Then it must be the case that
Mi(t + l,p) = Mi(t,p1) . So
Mi(t + l,pj) � Mi(t,pj) 
{::} 8t + lb + r j E f = oP 11( 81 - 8t + lb) � 8tb + r j E f: �P 11( 81 - 8tb)
So 
Similarly 
Mi(t+ l,p1)� Mi(t,pj) {::} Pjt � R [J1- Ef :�Pj1]·
Using the fact that all strategies in the support of the mixed strategy must have equal 
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payoffs, the result (b), (c), and the first part of (a) follow immediately. To obtain the 
remainder of (a), note that if pit > 0 and pi, t + 1 > 0, then by Lemma 1, it follows that
Pik > 0 for all k S t+ 1. In particular, PiO > 0. It follows that Pjo = R/rj. For t � 1,
Pjt = R [fj- Ef :�Pj/-Pj,t-11 = Pj,t-1- RPj,t-l = RPj,t-1
So, by induction on t, 
R-tPjt = r.R J 
Lemma 9: Let p = (p1,p2) be a Nash equilibrium. For any t � 1,
a. Pjt S Q[fj- Ef:�Pj1J- iRPj,t-l· 
b Q[ 1 t -1 ] 1 R o· P jt < r j - E / = oP jl -8 P j, t -1 =* Pi, t + 1 = · 
o _ Q[ 1 " t -1 ] 1 R c. Pi,t+ 1> =* Pjt- rj- L.,.,/=OPj/ -8 Pj,t-1·. . - 1-d. If t � 3, Pi,t+ 1>0 and Pj,t-l = 0 =* Pjt = Qpj,t-2 +-sRPj,t-3
D 
Proof: Assume that Pi, t + 1 > 0. Then it follows from Lemma 1 that Pi, t _ 1 > 0.
Hence, Mi(t + l,pj) � Mi(t- l,pj). So
+ r .st -1(1 - o2)b "t -2P . > Mt -1(1 - 82)J L.,., I= 0 Jl -
(1 -o2)b 1 t _ 2 1 - o2b � Pjt � o(l - ob)[ri- E1=0Pj1]- o(l - ob)Pi,t- 1 
= Q[fj- Ef :�Pj1]- (Q+iR)Pj,t-l 
_ Q[ 1 "t -1 ] 1 R - r j - L.,., I= oP jl -8 p j, t -1' 
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So 
Mi(t + l,pj) � Mi(t- l,pj) #' Pjt � Q[/j- l:f;: 5Pj1J- iRPj, t-1·
Similarly, 
Mi(t+l,pj)� Mi(t- l,pj) #' Pjt� Q[/j- l:f;:5Pj1J- iRPj,t-l 
So (a) and ( c) follow from these inequalities, by an argument similar to that in Lemma
2. Note that Lemma 1 implies that Mi(t + l,p) � Mi(t- l,pj) 
Now if Pj, t-l = 0, then we get
Pjt = Q[/j- l:f ;:�Pj/] 
1 t-3 1- 1-= Q[r j - 2: l = oP jl] - l)Rp j, t -3 - Qp j, t -2 + l)Rp j, t -3 
- 1-= Qp j, t -2 + l)R P j, t -3 D 
Putting together the above lemmas, we can completely characterize the Nash 
equilibrium of the game. Proposition 1 characterizes equilibria that begin with a non­
empty simultaneous offer phase. Proposition 2 characterizes the alternating offer 
equilibria. 
Proposition 1: Let p = (Pv p2) be a Nash equilibrium satisfying p10 > 0 and p20 > 0.
Then it must be of one of the following two forms: 
Form 1: (Full simultaneous offer equilibrium) There exists an integer M ;:::: 0 such for 
i = 1, 2 
-t R - r· P - z it T• i 
Pit= 0
where M satisfies
RM+ l<r ·<RM - z-
for 0 � t � M - l 
fort = M 
otherwise 
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Form 2: (Partial simultaneous offer equilibrium) The players can be labeled
{i,j} = {1,2} and there exists an integer M ;:::: O, and an integer J;:::: 1, such that
and 
Pit = 0
r·Q 
P - J jt - QJ - Ir ·  J 
Pit = 0
where M ;:::: 0 and J > 0 satisfy
RM.+ lQJ S ri S RM+ lQJ - 1 
RMQJ < r . < RM+ 2QJ - 1 - J-
Proof: See Appendix 
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for 0 s t  s M 
for t = M + 21, 1 s l s J - 1
otherwise 
for 0 S t S M -1  
for t = M + 21 + 1, 1 s l s J -1
otherwise 
Proposition 1!: Let p = (p1, p2) be a Nash equilibrium satisfying PiO = 0. Then it must
be of the following form: 
Form 9: (Alternating offer equilibrium) There exists an integer J :'.:: 1, such that
and 
P - QQ/-lit ri 
1 [QJ -1 
-
]P · 2J = -r · -r · i, i i 
Pit= 0 
. QJ-l --r·
P - J jO r .QJ-l J 
r·Q 
P - -;:...,.J � jt r .QJ -l J 
Pjt = 0 
where J > 0 satisfies
QJ::::; ri::::; QJ-l 
0 <r· < QJ-lR- J -
Proof: See Appendix. 
for t = 2l - 1, 1 ::::; l ::::; J -1
otherwise 
for � = 2l, 1 ::::; l ::::; J - 1
otherwise 
Corollary 1: If rj > R, then there is a pure strategy equilibrium. There are two cases:
Case I: 'fi > R. Here we have a unique equilibrium with PiO = Pjo = 1.
Case II: 'fi < R. Here we have a unique equilibrium with PiO = 1, p jl = 1.
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Proof: This follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. Since 'fj > R, it follows that
'f j > Rk and r j > Qk for all k � 1. Therefore, the only values that can be chosen for M
and J are M = 0, J = 0 (in case 1) in which case
or M = - 1, J = 1 (case 3) in which case
QJ < R < r i < R < QJ - 1 
R QJ - 1 = R < r j < 1 = QJ - 1 
The only way we can have a pure strategy equilibrium is if M = 0 and J = 0, or if if
and only if 
R < ri < 1
R < rj < l
and M = - 1, J = 1 if and only if
Q < 'fi < 1
R < rj < l 
Corollary 2: If r1 < Q and r2 < Q, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
D 
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 1. The only way we can have a pure 
strategy equilibrium is if M = 0 and J = 0, or M = - 1, J = 1. But in the first case,
we must have R < 'fi < 1 and R < 'f j < 1. But Q < R :::;. Q < 'fi and Q < 'f i' a
contradiction. Similarly, in the second case, we have Q < 'fi < 1 and R < r j < 1. But
again this implies Q < 'f i' a contradiction. D 
We now define a set .N' C (0, 1] x [O, 1] which we call the necktie as follows:
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�r - - -(- - ) c [O 1]2• - > Q_ > - > Q_ }J� r rl, r2 - ' . rl -Rr2, -r2 -Rrl 
Theorem: There is a Nash equilibrium satisfying Pio> 0 and p20 > 0 only if r E .N'. If
r � .N', then there is a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is an alternating offer
equilibrium such that if r j > ri, then Pi, 2k = p j, 2k + 1 = 0 for all k � 0.
Proof: Assume that Pio> 0 and p20 > 0. Then by proposition 1, there are two cases. If
the equilibrium is a full simultaneous offer equilibrium, then for some integer M � 0,
RM+ 1 < r. < RM- i -
RM+ 1 < r. < RM. -J-
It is easily verified that R2 > Q,from which it follows that
- > R. M + 1 > R- > Q_ T· T ·  -T · i- - J RJ
A similar argument establishes that 
- > Q_ rj Rri .
On the other hand, if the equilibrium is a partial simultaneous offer equilibrium, then 
there are integers M � 0, and J > 0 such that
RM+ lQJ � ri � RM+ lQJ -1 
RMQJ < r . < RM+ 2QJ -1- J -
It follows that 
f. > RM+lQJ = QRM+2QJ-1 > Q'f. i- R -RJ 
Similarly, 
_ _ 
r: > RMQJ = Q RM+ lQJ -1 > Qr .. J- R -Ri 
To show the second part of the proposition, suppose that r � .N'. Assume that r i > r i' so
that 'fi < rj. Then since r � .N', ri < (Q/R)rj. By the above argument, there is no
equilibrium that begins with a simultaneous offer; · Further, by proposition 2, for any 
alternating offer equilibrium with Pio= 0 there must be an integer J > 0 such that
11 
QJ < ri, and r j � QJ - 1 R. But this implies that ri 2:: QJ = ( Q / R)QJ - 1 R 2:: ( Q / R)r i'
which is a contradiction. Since there must exist at least one equilibrium, there must be 
an alternating offer equilibrium with Pjo = 0, and by proposition 2, it follows that it is
umque. A similar argument establishes that if r � N, with ri < r i' then there is a
unique alternating offer equilibrium with PiO = 0. D 
The theorem shows that outside the necktie the unique equilibrium is an 
alternating offer equilibrium with no simultaneous offers phase. The simple structure of 
the necktie, implies several properties, which are stated formally as Corollaries 3, 4 and 
5. Informally, they are stated as follows:
1. If the players are sufficiently patient, then alternating offers is the unique
equilibrium. 
2. If both players are suffiCiently likely to be high benefit types, then alternating
offers is the unique equilibrium. 
3. If the players' beliefs about each other are sufficiently different, then
alternating offers is the unique equiliprium. 
Corollary 9. Fix {r1, r2, b} with r1 ':/:- r2 and 0 < b < 1. Then there exists 8 such that
the unique equilibrium is alternating offers for all 8 2:: 8. 
Corollary,/. Fix {�,8,b} with � E (0,1) and 0 < b < 8 < 1. Then there exists r2
< 1- � such that the unique equilibrium is alternating offers, for all (r1, r2) such that
r2 €( r2, 1-�) and 1 2:: r1 2:: r2 + Ll. 
Corollary 5. Fix {8, b} with 0 < b < 8 < 1. Then there exists E E (0, 1) such that the
unique equilibrium is alternating offers for all ( r1, r2) E (0, 1 )
2 such that r1 -r2 2:: E. 
All of these results follow directly from the definition of N, which says that all �oints in
the necktie lie in the quadrilateral bounded by the points (1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 8g-��), b(l -8) -(8(1 -b)' O).
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These can be illustrated using a "belief diagram", similar to what appears in 
Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987). Figures 1-3 represent the common knowledge beliefs 
of the players, with r1 on the horizontal axis and r2 on the vertical axis. The diagonal
represents the case of symmetric beliefs where r1 = r2. Below of the diagonal, player 1
is believed to be the more likely of the two players to have a high benefit, and the 
reverse is true above the diagonal. The previous section characterized the equilibrium 
correspondence mapping the unit square of beliefs into Bayesian equilibria. The 
equilibrium for the case of 8 = 75 and b = .5 are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, each of
which divides the unit square into several regions. The necktie is the quadrilateral 
bounded by the slanted lines near the diagonal. In the shaded region of .Figure 1 there 
is an equilibrium which is alternating offers and this equilibrium is unique outside the 
necktie. Figure 2 shows the structure of equilibria inside the necktie. In the gray 
shaded areas, a simultaneous offer phase precedes the alternating offer phase. The black 
areas have no alternating offer phase. Otherwise, the length of the simultaneous offer 
phase is indicated by the darkness of shading, with darker shades representing longer 
simultaneous offer phases. The areas of overlap, implying multiple equilibria, are 
indicated in black. Figure 3 shows the effect of increasing 8 to .90. The main thing to 
notice is that the necktie becomes D;arrower. In the llmit it converges to the diagonal, 
which implies the property stated in the Corollary 1. 
4 SOLUTION IN BEHAVIOR STRATEGIES 
Define 
fit = L,! � tPii 
9it = L, l 2: tPii 
to be the cumulative spent and unspent probability for player i at move t. Then the 
behavioral strategy for the high benefit type player i is 
_Pit qit - 9i(
Thus, qit is the conditional probability a high type will give in given that neither player
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has given in yet. For the alternating offer solution, we get for 1 ::; l::; J -1
where 
g - g -1 
" p -1 Q "I -1 Qk -1i, 21 -1 - i, 21 - - L.. k < 21 ik - -r i L.. k = 1 
- 1-1 
- 1 -1 -Q -1.[Ql -1 -- ] - r· r· ri i i 
�
 1 (- /Q l-l) ru = - ri ' 
is the posterior of r i at the zth inning: in other words,
� 1 -r·1 = -r· = r· i i t' 
which is simply Bayes rule for updating rit given the behavioral strategy qit· 
Similarly, for player j, we get 9jO = 1, and for t= 2!, 1::; l::; J -1
So 
rjQ· J-1-1-k rj -J-1 
g j, 21 = Ek > 21Pik = QJ -IE k = 0 Q = QJ -1[ 1 -Q 
] 
- � � 
- - QJ-lrj _ rj _ -J-l 
QJ -1 - -QJ -1 QJ -1 + - -Q -r· - r· 1 - J J 
QJ-l
:::::- 'if ·1 QJ -Ir - J - --------=--j, l + 1 1 -r ·1q · 21 - -J I Q J J, 1 -(1 -Q - ) 
1 -QJ -I 
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-QJ - I - -J - (/ + 1)
- Q 1-Q 
which is simply Bayes rule for updating f jt given the behavioral strategy q jt· 
5 CONCLUSION 
The mam point of this paper was to show that assumption of "alternating offers,'' 
commonly used in theoretical models of bargaining, arises endogenously· as the unique 
equilibrium of a simultaneous-move infinite horizon bargaining game, if players are 
sufficiently patient or if their beliefs are sufficiently disparate. The model we use to 
demonstrate this is a very simple one, with two types of each player, and only two 
available strategies for each player. A natural next question to investigate is whether 
this main feature of our model is robust to more general specifications. In addition to 
allowing for a larger variety of types and continuous strategy spaces (corresponding to 
"real" bargaining), it would also be interesting to e�tend the result to games with a 
richer payoff structure, particularly a payoff structure in which there is less surplus lost 
when both parties simultaneously concede. Results elsewhere in the literature on games 
of timing (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Hendricks and Wilson (1989)) and on 
bargaining games specifically (Abreu and Gul (1992)), suggest that such generalizations 
are possible. 
15 
REFERENCES 
Abreu, D., and F. Gul, "Bargaining with obstinate players", mimeo, (December, 1992). 
Ausbel, L. and R. Deneckere, "A direct mechanism characterization of sequential 
bare;aining with one-sided incomplete information", Journal of Economic Theory,
48 ( 1989): 18-46. 
Chatterjee, K., and L. Samuelson, "Bargaining with two sided incomplete information:
An infinite horizon model with alternating offers", Review of Economic Studies, 54 
(1987): 175-192. 
Cramton, P. C., "Bargaining with incomplete information: An infinite horizon model 
with continuous uncertainty", Review of Economic Studies, 51 (1984): 579-594. 
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine and J. Tirole, "Infinite horizon models in bargaining with 
one-sided incomplete information", in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, (A. 
Roth, editor), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985: 73-98. 
Fudenberg, D .. and J. Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1991. 
Grossman, S. and M. Perry, "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," 
Journal of Economic Theory, 39 (1986): 119-54. 
Hendricks, K. and C. Wilson, "The war of attrition in discrete time," mimeo, 1989.
Rubinstein, A., "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model", Econometrica, 50 (1982): 
97-109. 
Rubinstein, A., "A bargaining model under incomplete information", Econometrica, 53 
(1985): 1151-1172. 
Smith, Maynard Jr., "The theory of games and evolution in animal conflicts," Journal 
of Theoretical Biology, 47 (1974): 209-21 
16 
APPENDIX 
Lemma 0. Let 7r be a Nash equilibrium. Then 7ri00 = 1 and 7r� = 0.
Proof: Consider type L. We show that iterated elimination of strictly dominant
strategies exhibits all actions except oo for type L. Giving in immediately (action 0)
yields an expected payoff of b L < 0, which is strictly dominated by a waiting forever
(action oo) which guarantees a payoff of at least 0. Therefore eliminate all strategies
with 7rp > 0. Given 7rp = 0, it follows that giving in on a second round (action 1) is
strictly dominated by waiting forever ( oo). Therefore eliminate all strategies with 7rif 
> 0. In a similar way, one can show that if 7ri£ = O, Vk = 0, 1, ... ,t then action t + 1 is
strictly dominated by oo. By induction, it follows that 7riJ; = 0, Vt < oo. Therefore in
any Nash equilibrium, 7ri00 = 1, i = 1, 2.
Next consider type Hof player i.· Let 7r be a Nash equilibrium. From above, 7r'J,00 = 1.
Therefore, 
Mf(oo, po:)::::; rj � Dt7rJ,t,andt=O 
Mf(k,p2) = (1- r·) okb+r
'. ff:18t7rJf + b � 8k7rJf]J Jt=O t=k 
As k � oo, the LHS converges to 1 - r i > 0 and the RHS converges to 0. Therefore,
for sufficiently high k, Mf (k,p2) > Mf (oo,p2) .
Therefore, any strategy with 7rk00 > 0 is never a weak best response to  7r2. Since 7r is a
Nash equilibrium, it follows that 7rk00 = 0. By a similar argument, 7rk00 = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Let p be a Nash equilibrium with p10 > 0 and p2 0  > 0. Let
M � 0 be the last round in which both players mix, and L � 0 be the number of rounds
in which only one player mixes. There are two cases: 
Case 1: L = 0 
By Lemma 2, we have
R-tPit= r:R i 
If L = O, then we must have
for 0 5= t 5= M - 1 
M -1 R M -1-1 1 -RM R
M -ri PiM = 1- L/ = 0 Pi/= 1- riL/ = 0 R = 1- ri = ri .
- -M For this to be an equilibrium, we must have 0 < PiM' which implies .that ri 5= R .
Also, by Lemma 2, we must have
P. <RRM �RM -r.<RRM �RM+1<r ..iM -ri i - - i 
Hence, we hav� shown that 
RM+l <r·<RM- i -
A similar argument for player j establishes that the mixed strategy for j takes the same 
form, and that r j must satisfy the inequality
RM+l <r· <RM- J -
Thus, the equilibrium must be of the first form. 
Case 2: L > 1 
Without loss of generality, assume that Pi,M + 1 =·0 and Pj,M + 1 > 0. Then, by
Lemma 1, it follows that Pi,M + 2k-l = Pj,M + 2k = 0 for all 1 5= k. By Lemma 2 (a),
we have 
Pit = f Rt for 0 5= t 5= M. i 
As long as k � 1 and 2k + 1 5= L, it follows that p j,M + 2k + 1 =f. 0. So by Lemma 3 ( c),
since Pi,M + 2k-l = 0, 
_
 Q[ 1 '°' M + 2k -2 ] Pi,M+2k - ri - L.J/=0 Pu 
If k = 1, then
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Pi,M + 2k = Pi,M + 2 = Q[ii - I:� oPil] 
_ 
QR[ 1 " M -1 J Q -R ri-.t...J /=OPil- PiM
= �PiM -QpiM = �RPiM 
_ 
QRRRM _ QRM+l-R ri - ri 
For k > 1, we have Pi,M +2k-l = Pi,M +2k_3 = 0. So usmg Lemma 3 (d.) ·(with i 
playing the role of j) , we get 
- Q-M+l-k.,-1Pi,M+2k = Qpi,M+2k-2 = riR Q 
Let J be the smallest integer for which 2J + 1 > L. Then we must have
Pi, M + 2J + k = ·O for all k � 1. Hence, since I: kPik = 1, it must be that
But 
So 
Pi,M +2J = 1- Lk < M +2JPik 
= M[1- RM + 1] +RM+ 1[1-QJ-lJ}
= i.[1 - RM+ lQJ -1 Jt 
""""" 1 -M+l-J-1 Pi,M+21 = l- L.,, k<M+2JPik = l- rP- R Q J
RM+ lQJ -1 _ r. - i - ri 
Since Pi,M + 2J � 0, it follows that ri:::; R
M+ 1QJ -l. Also, from Lemma 3 (a), and
since Pj,M + 2J + 1 = 0,
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It follows that 
# RM+ lQJ -1 _ QRM + lQJ -1 < ri
# RM+lQJ <r ·- i 
We note that generically, the above weak inequalities will be strict, implying that 
Pi,M + 2J > 0, and that L = 2J. For the remainder of the proof we assume we are in
this generic case.
Next, for player j, we must have, by Lemma 2, that
for 0 � t � M-1
Now consider the last round of rn,ixing for player j: t = M + 2J -1. Now if J > 1, then
by Lemma 3, since Pi,M + 2J > 0 and Pj, t-l = Pj,M + 2J = 0, it follows from Lemma 3
that 
1 t-1 1- 1 1-p jt = Q[r j - I: l = oP jl] -8Rp j, t-1 = Q[r j - 1 + P jt] -8Rp j, t -1
_ Qrj 1_ . Qri# P jtQ = 'ij- 8Rp j, t -1 = 7j 
r ·Q 
#P·t= LJ rjQ 
By induction on l, as long as 1 < l < J, we get, by Lemma. 3, that
1 r·Q P - p - J j, M + 2/ -1 Q j, M + 2/ + 1 r .QJ -l + 1'J 
Finally, for l = 1, .we get that Pj,M + 21_1= Pj,M+1. If L > 2, then by Lemma 3,
_ Q[ 1 "" M + 1 ]- r j - LI/ = 0 p j/ 
20
= R
QR[f. - l:1�-02P·z] -Qp· M-1 -QP· M -Qp· M+lJ - J J, J, J, 
= Q[�]Pj,M -1 -QPj,M -QPj,M+1
-¢;> Qpj,M + 1 = Q[�]Pj,M -1 -Q Pj,M -Pj, M + 3
-¢;> Pj,M+l = [�]Pj,M-l -Pj,M -�Pj,M+3
R R-M-1 1 Qrj = [RJrjR -Q r .QJ-1 -Pj,MJ 
f. 
= l_RM - J -
• 
r j r .QJ -1 P J, MJ 
Also, as in the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that 
1 M l-Pj,M + 1 = Q[rj - 2:1=0Pj1] -8Rpj,M
= Q[fj - 2:� (/Pjz] -(Q + �R)Pj,Jl! 
- 1- 1-. = Qpj,M -1+8RPj,M -2 -(Q + 8R)PjM
= QRRM-l +lRRRM-2 rj 8 rj 
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= �RM-1[1 !6 -Q]-(Q+iR)PjM 
= i,RM-l[Q-QR]-(Q +iR)PjM J 
Q-M 1-= rjR -(Q +fiR)PjM
Q-M 1) =rjR -(R+fiPjM 
But from ( *) and ( **) above, we get
Q T· -M (R 1) 1 RM J r:R - + 7 P3·M = r: - QJ -1 -P j, MJ v J r. J 
And, plugging into ( **) , we get
QRMQJ -l(i- R)
= 
rjQJ-l(i-R) 
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( R + l )RM QJ -( R + l )r . 
+ 8 8 J 
rjQJ -l(t-R) 
-
(R +t)'RMQJ-1 _QJlMQJ-1 _ (R +t)rj
r jQJ -1(!-R) 
-
(R+t-Q)RMQJ-l_(R+t)rj 
r jQJ -1(t -R)
(R +i-1 + Q)RMQJ-1-(R +!-1 + l)rj
-
rjQJ -l(t-R) 
rj-RMQJ 
rjQJ-l(t-R) 
RMQJ-l --rj 
---Q� J--�1� 
-P jMrj 
So we have shown that 
and 
RMQJ-1 -- -rj PjM + 1 QJ -1 
-PjMrj 
Now PjM 2:'.: 0 {:> rj 2:'.: RMQJ. Also, by Lemma 2 (c) , we must have
< R[ 1 M -1 ) _ R[ 1 ""M -2 ) R _ R RMP jM - r j - I: I= o P jl - r j - L.. / = o P jl - P j, M -1 -r j 
- -M-J rj-R Q R-M{:> <-R 
rjQJ -l(t-R) -rj 
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rj- RMQJ:::; RRMQJ -l(* - R) 
rj:::; RMQJ + RRMQJ -1(� - R)
rj:::; RMQJ-1['Q+ R(*- R)] = RMQJ-1[1- 1t8r+ f- R+ R2]
We note that the constraint PjM + 1 � 0 is not binding because
RMQJ-1 -- r· 
P jM + 1 � 0 <=> QJ -1 
J � P jMr· J 
<::> RMQJ-l[!+Q- R] � rj[l- R+!]
. <=> RMQJ-l[!+Q- R] � rj[R+!]
<=> RMQJ-l[!+ R- Q] > rj[R +!]
<=> RM QJ -1[1 + R - l + 8 R] > r ·[R + l]8 8 - J 8 
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But 
So we that 
# RM+ lQJ -l '?:. r'j[8R + 1]
JlM+l(jJ-l Jl,M+2(jJ-l# rj 5: 8R + 1 = R(8R + 1)
R( 8R + 1) = (1 -R)(l + 2R) 5: (1 -R)(l + R) = 1 -R2 5: 1
Hence, the restriction on r j is not binding. D 
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. So we only verify
the inequalities on rj and fi. For player i, in order for Pi to be an equilibrium strategy,
we need to have 
0 < - < QJ-l-Pi,2J # ri -
Also, by Lemma 2, we need
P. < QQJ -1 # 1-[QJ -1 _ r ·] < QQJ -1i, 2J -r i r i i -r i 
# QJ 5: ri
So we have shown that 
For Player j, since PiO = 0 and Pil > 0, if follows from Lemma 2b that
25 
> R [ 1 "t-1 ] _RP jO - r j - L..,, 1 = oP jl -r j 
# 
QJ -1 -r j > R # QJ -1 -r. > RQJ -1 # QJ -1 -RQJ -1 > r. r jQJ -1 -r j J - - J 
#r·<QJ-lRJ -
Note that the inequality PjO :::; 1 does not impose any additional constraint, as it 1s
always satisfied: 
QJ-1 --rj -J 1 -J 1 Pjo:::; 1 #--Q�J--- 1-=-:::;1# Q 
- -rj :::; rjQ -rj 
........... QJ -1 QJ -1 < - ........... QJ -1- < -.,,....,... -r· r · .,,....,... r· r· J - J J - J 
# QJ-1< 1
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0 R Q-R 1-R Q Q2
Figure 1. The necktie (b = .5, 8 = . 75) is quadrilateral bounded by (0, 0),
(0, q�;), (1, 1), and (q�;,o). Alternating offer equilibria exist in shaded
areas, and are unique outside the necktie. Simultaneous move equilibria 
exist in the black-shaded squares. 
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Figure 2. Graph of equilibrium correspondence for b = .5, � = .75. Unique
alternating move equilibrium in white region. Unique simultaneous move 
equilibrium in black square areas. Shaded areas have J stages of simultaneous
move followed by alternating move. Darker shaded areas indicate larger J. 
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Figure 3. Graph of equilibrium correspondence for b - .5, h - .9. See 
Figure 2 for description.
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